Nice article, that I did miss back when you published, and now I'm finding out. I only have one question, and I would be very interested in hearing your opinion about it. I fully agree with you that these systems are likely to be a nice target to be attacked in case of a conflict. But at the same time, if you atack early-warning satellites, wouldn't that be too risky? I mean, an attack like that wouldn't be read by the US as a preliminary step toward an ICBM exchange with any adversary, putting all the US nuclear forces on alert and ready to launch?
It depends, but your question is reasonable. What I am doing is using the USAF/USSF leadership's words to show they are saying one thing, but then highlight that the service is doing the same thing again--and it's getting much more expensive to do so. Unreasonably so. But I'll try a few answers, at the risk of getting into the realm of wargaming.
There are different ways to attack the satellite. Some involve direct attack like a missile launch, which would be one of the most overt ways to take a satellite out. The USAF/USSF seems to think this is a likely way, but I disagree as it takes too much time and as you pointed out, people would know who did it.
There are other, less obvious ways, such as unknown satellites moving in orbit to disable the satellite or block the satellite's view and communications ability. China and Russia both have this capability and the further out on orbit they are, the less chance there might be for SSA radar to pick them up.
There's also the fact that the ground station and its backups are easy targets--easier than the satellites to reach. Simple GPS-guided cruise missiles could take them out. Or, more deviously, the adversary could leverage things like flash-mobs, and have them inadvertently somehow jam ground station telemetry--maybe for five to ten minutes. That would give a plausibly deniability to an adversary, because the U.S. could never be sure who did it.
Nice article, that I did miss back when you published, and now I'm finding out. I only have one question, and I would be very interested in hearing your opinion about it. I fully agree with you that these systems are likely to be a nice target to be attacked in case of a conflict. But at the same time, if you atack early-warning satellites, wouldn't that be too risky? I mean, an attack like that wouldn't be read by the US as a preliminary step toward an ICBM exchange with any adversary, putting all the US nuclear forces on alert and ready to launch?
Hi Angel!
It depends, but your question is reasonable. What I am doing is using the USAF/USSF leadership's words to show they are saying one thing, but then highlight that the service is doing the same thing again--and it's getting much more expensive to do so. Unreasonably so. But I'll try a few answers, at the risk of getting into the realm of wargaming.
There are different ways to attack the satellite. Some involve direct attack like a missile launch, which would be one of the most overt ways to take a satellite out. The USAF/USSF seems to think this is a likely way, but I disagree as it takes too much time and as you pointed out, people would know who did it.
There are other, less obvious ways, such as unknown satellites moving in orbit to disable the satellite or block the satellite's view and communications ability. China and Russia both have this capability and the further out on orbit they are, the less chance there might be for SSA radar to pick them up.
There's also the fact that the ground station and its backups are easy targets--easier than the satellites to reach. Simple GPS-guided cruise missiles could take them out. Or, more deviously, the adversary could leverage things like flash-mobs, and have them inadvertently somehow jam ground station telemetry--maybe for five to ten minutes. That would give a plausibly deniability to an adversary, because the U.S. could never be sure who did it.
Thanks, John! Indeed you pointed out more real and plausible threats. As always it is a pleasure to read you.